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Epistemological Matters
Matter for Theological
Understanding
1

Joseph LaPorte

Y

ou could understand the philosophical discipline of epistemology to
be the study of how to think properly about the world—as we typically
take people to do when we say they are right-thinking, right-headed, or
sensible. I’ll survey a couple of important connections between this field
of epistemology, on the one hand, and theology, on the other. The connections concern two discrete epistemological areas, whose distance one from
another helps to indicate the great variety in areas of mutual interest for
epistemologists and theologians. My goal is not to bridge the two discrete
epistemological areas: each will have its own section. And I make no claims
to comprehensiveness in discussing either area. My goal is just to fire the
imagination, in order to draw readers more-or-less new to epistemology
(or theology) into further study; but I hope that there will be matter here
even for those who claim authority in both epistemology and theology.2

1. Thanks to Emily, Philip, and especially Michael, who keeps up the pressure.
Thanks also to colleagues Curtis Gruenler and Andrew Dell’Olio.
2. I’ll cite sparingly to two ends: both in order to (i) whet intuitions and pique interest by leading readers to see connections to traditions and literature with which they
may be already familiar, and in order to (ii) show readers where to go to pursue a topic
further.
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The first topic concerns what it is for a belief to be rational or warranted, as
opposed to irrational or otherwise epistemically wanting. The second topic
concerns an interesting contrast between different ways one might know
the same topic.

1. Is Christian Belief Gullible? The Pastafarian
Threat.
Perhaps you have heard of Pastafarianism. According to this silly farce,
“The Flying Spaghetti Monster did come unto” the prophet Aunt Dee Dee,
waiting at the front of Fred’s Italian Corner, for she was hungry
and her wait did seem to be unending, and he filled her with His
Heavenly Smells, and unto her He did speak . . .3

If you believed that, you’d have a kooky belief. You should not believe
kooky things. Christian belief is relevantly similar, with respect to evidence.
So Christian belief is kooky, too. So you have every reason to reject Christian belief.
How convincing is this argument? Something along its lines is certainly widely popular. Wikipedia links several satirical parodies with a
similar moral that have gone culturally viral. These include belief in a pink,
invisible unicorn and belief in Bertrand Russell’s teapot orbiting between
Earth and Mars: Russell is quoted as proclaiming “the Christian God just
as unlikely.”4 Similar polemic has since burgeoned, with “the New Atheism” that has made inroads into the culture, or at least brought the culture’s
latent sympathy into the open. The New Atheism marches under the banner of science and sophistication. Bigwigs and bestsellers of the movement
(Dawkins, Harris, and so on) are well-known and easily accessed. The main
message of the New Atheistic group is that believing in the Gospel is fantastically gullible. So is believing in any religious revelation, perhaps even
believing in God.
What well-known gullibility-chargers don’t much acknowledge is
that Christian epistemologists have articulated important responses to the
3. These are the first lines of the first page Google turns up today under ‘Pastafarianism’: http://www.loose-canon.info/page53.html (accessed July 10, 2014).
4. The attribution is plausible and in the same spirit of Russell and the movement I
now identify. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_teapot#cite_note-garvey-2 (accessed July 10, 2014).
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charges. The conclusion of these responses, which are developed with great
subtlety and power, is that the charges of gullibility are unconvincing. My
purpose in this section is to introduce the reader to one Christian response
to the gullibility charge. This response seems promising and accessible,
at least in its outlines, to the intelligent laity and professional academics
of other fields. The response that I will distill from the literature seems to
harmonize with all of the main lines of thinking on the issue in the Christian tradition of epistemology. The best spokesperson at present for the
response is the distinguished epistemologist Alvin Plantinga, whose work
I will quickly sketch. The reader will think of a number of objections to
Plantinga’s response quickly—too quickly. Most objections springing readily to mind are misunderstandings. I will address such misunderstandings,
in an attempt to clarify the main idea. Then I’ll situate the main epistemological idea with respect to familiar claims of a couple of venerable Christian traditions.
Plantinga’s main point, which goes back to Thomas Reid and, arguably, to Aquinas and earlier, is that we know something to be so if and only
if our belief that it is so, is produced in the manner in which it was designed
to be produced. In that case, we don’t merely believe; we really know. Our
belief is warranted—or, alternatively: right-headed, sensible, respectable,
rational in the sense of being a good assessment of reality by someone in
his right mind, or whatnot. Our belief is not crackpot or kooky or gullible
or such that anyone in his right mind would be ashamed to have it, because
again (and somewhat roughly), it is properly produced by an agent whose
cognitive faculties are functioning as they are supposed to function.
So consider your belief that your friend is looking at you over his cup
of coffee, as you sit in a café. Do you know it? That depends. If your coffee
has been spiked with a hallucinogen, and if the reason that you think you
have a friend looking at you is because you’re hallucinating that Ronald
McDonald is winking and smiling at you, his friend, over a cup, then you
don’t really have warrant here—you don’t know that your friend is looking
at you over his cup of coffee. The problem is not that you don’t really have
any friend looking at you—i.e., the problem is not that your belief is untrue.
You might really have an alarmed friend somewhere in the café, who has
just noticed you staring off into space. But you don’t know that you have a
friend looking at you. Your belief is unwarranted.
In the normal case of forming such a belief (“my friend is looking my
way over his cup”), you’d be fine. Your coffee would not be spiked. You’d
50
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just be enjoying yourself at a café, and you would know that your friend is
looking at you. You’d be looking his way, the light would be entering your
eyes, making the right impression on the right neurons, activating the right
connections in your neural network, to form the belief that your friend
is looking at you. This is how you’re designed to take in information like
this. You’re forming this belief just the way you’re supposed to. So you’re
rational, warranted, right-headed.
I’ve been talking in the abstract about what it takes in general for you
to have knowledge or warrant, for you to be in your right mind instead of
being out-of-it, irrational, wacky, kooky, etc. How does belief in the Gospel
measure up, or belief in God? Well, let’s take for granted at the moment that
the Gospel is true. So we’re supposing God has created you, in his own image, to have knowledge of him. And God has sent the Holy Spirit to move
you to assent to the truth of the Gospel (by hypothesis) as you recite the
Nicene Creed, say. In that case, you are rational in proclaiming the words of
the Creed. You can even be said to have knowledge—you’re operating just
as you were made to operate, in these circumstances, by hypothesis. You’re
warranted. And your belief is not, after all, kooky, wacky, irrational, unwarranted. Something similar applies to your belief in God.
Fine, you say: maybe my beliefs are rational if the Christian story is
true—my beliefs are rational by hypothesis. But that’s taking a lot for granted! Can we just assume, by hypothesis that we are made in God’s image, as
Christianity maintains? Isn’t that begging the whole question? Isn’t it trying
to prove that Christianity is true by assuming it is true? Something like this
objection will come to your mind soon after you’ve understood Plantinga’s
position, if you’re typical. The objection has a satisfying answer.
The satisfying answer cannot be understood unless we understand
the point of Plantinga’s project. Plantinga’s project is not an offensive one;
it is a defensive one. A Christian should not appeal to her own cognitive
operation according to design in order to prove to the New Atheist that
her Christian belief is true and therefore warranted and rational. It is at
this point that the expected, familiar Christian strategy against nonbelief,
however valid it may be in its own right, can distract us and make it harder
to understand what’s going on, by predisposing us to hear what we expect
to hear. The familiar Christian strategy is to argue that Christianity is true;
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but that’s not what’s going on here.5 If we can show that Christianity is true,
showing that isn’t part of this project. For all that we need to say here, it’s
the Holy Spirit’s job to get us to see that Christianity is true, period. It’s not
that you have to believe that final statement, and so end your account of
Christian apologetics as a whole here, with that period; instead, you’ll probably insist that humans have an important role to play, in helping to move
hearts and minds to assent to the Gospel. Granted. But that isn’t relevant
to what’s going on here, in this paper (or this section of it). Perhaps Christians are to carry out an “offensive,” so to speak, by testimony, or perhaps
through stories, or perhaps through suggestive arguments, or perhaps even
through conclusive arguments starting from neutral premises to the effect
that Christianity is true. But set all that aside. It only shows there’s more to
a full account of Christian apologetics than the defensive strategy at issue
here. What more there is, however thin or rich, doesn’t matter for our purposes. With or without the rest, and however the rest is to be understood,
the project here remains: it is the purely defensive project of showing that
believers have been given no convincing reason to buckle to the atheist’s objections—whether or not Christianity is true.
The New Atheist—not the Christian epistemologist—is the one on the
offensive, so far as issues relevant here are concerned. The New Atheist is
on the attack, trying to convince Christians that their belief is kooky, irrational, unwarranted, wildly speculative or arbitrary (like Aunt Dee Dee’s).
Further, the New Atheist is the one begging the question—not the Christian
epistemologist sharing Plantinga’s idea. The New Atheist thinks she has the
Christian in a bind: her accusation is,
you can’t show how your belief is more rational than some kook’s
belief in a flying spaghetti monster. For all you can tell, it isn’t any
different. For all you can tell, all supposedly divine testimony is a
delusion or confusion of some sort. So your belief is kooky because
5. Plantinga ends his massive volume (Warranted Christian Belief, 499) by asking
whether the model of God’s operating in the world according to the Christian tradition, which model he’s been assuming hypothetically to hold all along in order to argue
for a correlative warrant, is true. But he can’t settle whether the model is true, to the
satisfaction of his opponents. His aim, he reminds the reader, has been:

to clear away certain objections, impedances, and obstacles to
Christian belief. Speaking for myself and of course not in the name
of philosophy, I can say only that it does, indeed, seem to me to be
true, and to be the maximally important truth.
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it’s unestablished. It’s out-on-a-limb. It’s without any solid basis or
credentials. It’s like Aunt Dee Dee’s belief.

The defensive parry to the charge (“not convincing”) is that in order
to have any claim on the Christian, you have to establish first that her
Christian belief is false. Only if the Christian story is false can you go on to
establish that therefore the belief is without solid epistemic credentials. If
in fact the belief is true, then it’s got excellent epistemic credentials, because
it’s produced, like your typical visual belief that your friend is before you at
the café, by proper function.6 That’s just the sort of belief the café patron
or the Christian is supposed to form, respectively, if she’s working properly,
in the circumstances.
The atheist is entitled to her own Naturalist Hypothesis (or other antiChristian hypothesis), according to which Naturalism is true. She can argue that if her hypothesis is true then Christian belief is not inspired by any
alleged Holy Spirit and accordingly not produced by way of God’s design.
But to show not (hence, gullibility), you can’t just assume not. The Christian
won’t be talked out of her story, which the New Atheist has entertained by
hypothesis, merely by a counter-story that the atheist can ask the Christian
in turn to assume by hypothesis.
Seldom does the New Atheist try to take the bull by the horns and
show from the start that Christian belief is false and that we aren’t operating properly in forming Christian belief, probably because that is a very
hard thing to establish. In my own experience, the most tempting efforts
at proceeding tend to drift back into question-begging ways of assuming
that the Christian’s take on this or that feature of the world is kooky and not
formed by design.
I’ve given a whirlwind tour of Plantinga’s reply to the New Atheism.
I have left alone, for the sake of space, any discussion of what science establishes, or whether it harmonizes with Christian belief or jars against it.
For details and extensions like these, I refer the reader to Plantinga’s terrific
6. Similar words apply if we replace talk about truth with talk about probability.
The New Atheist might say that she only has to show that Christian belief is improbable,
not that it’s false. Reply: improbable in some sort of objective respect (e.g., “three out
of four balls in this urn is red”)? If Christian belief is true, then the relevant probability
is very high (100%, because it’s just true, not mostly true or true most of the time or in
most cases). So you have to establish falsity before you can establish that. If the relevant
probability is epistemic, as seems more likely, then the charge is that Christian belief is
in some way unreasonable, implausible, something not to be bet on, etc.; but that’s just
another variant of the charge that it’s irrational, with which we’ve been dealing all along.
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work. I recommend Warranted Christian Belief and Where the Conflict Really Lies. Plantinga has other Warrant books, but they’re better suited for
other epistemologists than for the intelligent laity.
What’s left for this section is to situate Plantinga’s line with respect to
salient Christian traditions—however cursorily. Plantinga began calling his
work “Reformed Epistemology” and it’s still often discussed as such. But
the parts I’ve discussed, at least, are certainly compatible with, say, Catholic
tradition. There are a couple salient sticking points.
First, many of the specifics about just how God in his providence has
designed us to form Christian or theistic belief will have to be adapted to
different faith traditions (is it by way of the natural intellect[?]; the infused
gift of faith[?]; what[?]). But the project of filling out these specifics appears
to me to be hopeful.7 And the basic idea of warrant by way of proper function seems harmonious with many Christian traditions (it’s implicit in, say,
Aquinas, as Jenkins argues).
Second and relatedly, it might seem that faith is precisely not knowledge, because there is a sort of leap-in-the-dark aspect to it, or inconclusiveness about it. But much of the tension here, it seems to me, is linguistic
and not substantial. Christians talk past each other. For example, Augustine
“avoided the term knowledge” even for historical belief, in well-known writings on faith, in order to say that “belief, that is, faith, is a constituent part”
of what a good head will accept.8 Whether it’s that Jesus is Lord or that
Caesar crossed the Rubicon, “it is not proper, says Augustine, to say, ‘I know
it’;” I can only say I believe it.9 So there’s a surface-level conflict between
what Augustine says and what Plantinga says, because Plantinga says we
know that Jesus is Lord, and we know that Caesar crossed the Rubicon; we
don’t merely believe these things. Happily, the conflict here is superficial.
Consider that Augustine himself later “changed his mind . . . about the appropriateness of the word know,” in order to respect “common usage.”10 It’s
precisely common usage that epistemologists like Plantinga try to capture
today, in analyzing what it is to “know” something as opposed to merely believing it without sufficient warrant. So the conflict between Plantinga and
Augustine is superficial. So is what seems at first to be a tension between
7. See Jenkins, Thomas Aquinas; Mulder, Kierkegaard, 28–31.
8. Wilken, Spirit, 169.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
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Plantinga and other eminent theologians (Kierkegaard, if anyone, would
seem opposed).11

2. On Experiential Knowledge as Opposed to
Propositional Knowledge
My 14-year old son Philip mused on a puzzle yesterday at dinner, which
highlights the important difference between two types of knowledge. Isn’t
it strange, he remarked, that you might be struck, even surprised, how massive a whale is, when you see it, even if you didn’t really learn anything new
because you already knew the whale’s massive dimensions before you saw it.
You’re awestruck as if you’d just learned something about how massive the
whale is; but you didn’t just learn it. This puzzling situation highlights the
difference between two ways of knowing something: knowing it “experientially” and knowing it “propositionally” as it is sometimes put.
Experiential knowledge or understanding is important to have for
reasons suggested by theologians from Augustine to Jonathan Edwards,
John Henry Newman, and beyond.12 Suppose, to take an extreme case, that
I had no experiential knowledge about joy or happiness, having suffered
through a uniformly drab life. Even so, “though I had never experienced a
moment of happiness, I could nevertheless understand perfectly well what
happiness is, even what a paradisal life of complete happiness would be,”
purely propositionally: or anyway, it seems plausible to say so, following
Matthews.13 The reason that it seems plausible to say that I might understand, propositionally, what happiness is, is because I might be able to define
‘happiness’ and use the term sensibly, explaining people’s behavior by reference to their pursuing “happiness,” and so on. My experiential impoverishment—I have not gone through it—seems to issue in a corresponding
but distinct conceptual impoverishment. We can easily imagine someone
telling me, “You don’t understand what I’m going through,” in her times of
11. See Evans, “Kierkegaard”; on interpreting Aquinas harmoniously, see Plantinga,
Warranted Christian Belief, 91n.
12. For secondary literature about Augustine’s thoughts on experiential knowledge,
see Matthews, Augustine, Chapter 15, “Happiness”; Edwards’s thoughts on the matter
are discussed by Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, Chapter 9 (§2, “Jonathan Edwards”); Newman’s thoughts on experiential understanding are discussed in several of
John Crosby’s 2011 lectures (see especially Lecture 1: “The Personalist Spirit of Newman’s
Thought,” and Lecture 2: “Newman on the Human Person as a World of His Own.”).
13. Matthews, Augustine, 143.
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joy. She might say that I don’t know what it’s like to be happy even though I
know what happiness is.
My conceptual impoverishment would have deleterious effects. Perhaps
the most substantial or salient effect of the conceptual impoverishment is
that I would probably not have the understanding it takes to be motivated
to do what I know, propositionally, that I ought to do, to be happy: from a
Christian perspective, that would be to commit my life to Christ. Newman
accordingly warns that “there cannot be a more fatal mistake than to suppose we see what the doctrine” of eternal joy in Christ “means as soon as we
can use the words which signify it.” On the contrary, he insists, experiential
understanding of doctrinal matters like this “is all one with being serious”
about orienting our lives.14
So it seems fitting that Aquinas closely associates the highest wisdom,
whereby we “judge and order” our lives and actions, with an “intimate”—
I suggest experiential—comprehension of what the Divine ways are all
about.15 Aquinas juxtaposes the highest wisdom with merely propositional
knowledge that any student of ethics might have “if he has learnt the science
of morals.” That inferior sort of wisdom “which is acquired by the study and
research of reason,” does not hold us back from sin. But the highest wisdom
does. The highest wisdom is backed by a comprehension from the insider’s
perspective of an experiential union with God in the act of love, by means
of which the agent “contemplates Divine things in themselves.”
From the outsider’s merely speculative perspective, whereby we lack
real appreciation of what they’re really all about in spirit, “Divine rules” can
appear to be cold and commanding fiats, instead of the benevolent directives of a solicitous nurse and lover. Merely being well catechized or propositionally sophisticated is not enough to lift us from this misunderstanding
and thereby to give us “sympathy” for God’s directives. Someone without
the highest wisdom, who is nevertheless well-catechized, might say, in a
manner of speaking, “I know these precepts are good for me but I just can’t
get myself to believe it!” The connection between an experiential–propositional distinction, on the one hand, and wisdom in living, on the other
14. Newman, “Immortality.”
15. Aquinas, Summa, 2a2ae.45, “The Gift of Wisdom.” Aquinas isn’t directly addressing the topic of experiential understanding and his discussion does leave interpretive mysteries. I recall some years ago discussing this with Alfred Freddoso, who piqued
my interest by his own searching into puzzles about why Aquinas would organize his
Summa’s coverage of seven key virtues by putting the discussion of the highest wisdom
under the topic of love, rather than prudence.
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hand, sheds light on puzzling biblical pronouncements, such as “my yoke
is easy, and my burden is light” (Matt 11:30). Jesus’s teachings are hard.
Because the wise understand deeply the benevolent spirit behind divine
commandments, it can be “sweet” for them to do what would otherwise be
hard, as Aquinas says. Just so, if I have had first-hand experience of your
kindness, it can be easy for me to do what you ask me to do, even if you can’t
explain your reasons to me. Alternatively, if I’ve had first-hand experience
with a miserable consequence, it can be easy for me to do what it takes to
circumvent that outcome in the future, even if it means some effort on my
part. After all, I can vividly imagine the troubles I will otherwise bring upon
myself. Hence, imagination is closely associated in the literary tradition
with what I’ve been calling “experiential knowledge.” As C.S. Lewis says in
a related vein, “If the imagination were obedient, the appetites would give
us very little trouble.”16,17
The connection between an experiential/propositional distinction, on
the one hand, and wisdom in living, on the other hand, also lends new
dimensions to such readily understood pronouncements—understood
at face value anyway—as, “thou hast hid these things from the wise and
prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes” (Matt 11:25). Sometimes it is
propositional knowledge that separates the wise from children: hence, John
Duns Scotus observes that Aristotle, for all his wisdom, had no information
about the happiness “far more perfect than anything possible in this life,”
because Aristotle didn’t know about Yahweh’s special revelation through the
16. Lewis, Prayer, 17. The connection between epistemology and motivation here is
clearly of practical importance, but also has important theoretical applications. Thus, we
sometimes hear that God might allow us to suffer so much in part, at least, because God
knows that we would assent to going through with it if we were offered the opportunity.
Here’s an interesting objection: saying that “Christians who suffer horrendously would
have consented had they been asked for prospective consent” ignores that we “tend to
weight temporally near effects over temporally distant effects and the aversion of harm
over the procuring of greater goods” (Vitale, Review of Wandering in Darkness, 1196).
True, we do. I suggest even so that perhaps we would assent if we understood better—intuitively, experientially—just what’s at stake with the choice (observe that understanding
what’s at stake is anyway important to our freely choosing anything). As we anticipate
the future, the vivid, experiential side to our understanding fades away. Newman says
tellingly that “a sluggish will and a lukewarm love” might betray a myopic heart, which
“cannot see afar off,” to the redemption of promises (Newman, “The Power of Will,” 353).
17. The connection between the imagination and experiential knowledge is not
straightforward. Strictly speaking, one might imagine something that one’s had no firsthand experience with; on the other hand, one might consider even the imagination’s ability to bring that very thing to mind, a form of experience.

57

At t h e I n t e r s e c t i o n
prophets and Scriptures. Mere intelligence, which Aristotle had in plenty,
isn’t enough to learn anything about that kind of happiness. “From all this
it is apparent how much thanks must be given to our Creator, who through
faith has made us most certain of those things which pertain to our end and
to eternal life—things about which the most learned and ingenious men
can know almost nothing . . .” (I don’t necessarily recommend Scotus to the
uninitiated but some connections to experiential knowledge may be found
in more accessible secondary literature).18 Yet it is not always propositional
knowledge that separates the learned from children. On the contrary, great
propositional sophistication leaves room for a deeper, tacit understanding
formed from experiential contact.
I close with three further insights that a firm grasp on the epistemological distinction between experiential and propositional knowledge
promises to yield. First, the distinction seems crucial for understanding
conceptual change and enlightenment. Our dim experiential contact with
God now—“For now we see through a glass, darkly” (1 Cor 13:12)—permits just so much experientially grounded vision about God and God’s
ways to whet our appetites. So our longing for, say, final happiness is on face
value puzzling. “For who would want something of which he is unaware,
or run after something he does not know?” as Boethius asks,19 echoing
forbears like Augustine, who worried, “How then shall I seek for the happy
life?” Augustine never offers a settled response to the puzzle: “Certainly
we have the desire for it, but how I do not know,” he concedes.20 But he
hints that we understand enough experientially to long for the fulfillment
of the God’s promise.21 Just so, if God’s promises hold out, we will someday
say, with a character in Lewis’s stories, that we’ve received just what we’ve
“believed in and longed for”—despite our gaps in understanding. Indeed,
when you experience God’s gift, you might characterize it as what “I have
been looking for all of my life, though I never knew it till now.”22
The contrast here to finding what we were desiring all along might be to
this: receiving a conceptual overhaul so great that none of our experiences
18. Scotus, Philosophical Writings, 162. For the uninitiated, see Mackey, “Singular
and Universal.”
19. Boethius, Consolation, 108.
20. Augustine, Confessions, 196.
21. The connections here to the ancient tradition of negative theology are rich but I
leave the reader with only this prompt.
22. Lewis, Last Battle, 30, 196.
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now provide enough grasp on what God promises even for us to be able
to long for them—themselves—at all. That suggests unfortunately, as James
Alison might say, something more like a diabolical cult’s “displacement of
‘self ’” and all of its hopes and loves, than Christian redemption.23 All of the
conceptual groundwork that Augustine, Lewis, and Alison take for a start
in our conceptual understanding of the kingdom of heaven, visible now in,
say, a parent’s love for a child, would, instead, yield to something absolutely
foreign, something that we will find to be unrecognizable (cf. Jesus’s indications that the kingdom is already in our midst [Luke 17:20f.], albeit in seed
form [Matt 13:31–32; Mark 4:30–32; Luke 13:18–19]).24
One can understand the reluctance, on the part of some, to invite God
to move them. They’re afraid to pray “Thy will be done.” To be sure, there
is sin on our part, there is selfishness. But there may also be fear rooted
in ignorance for which one is not culpable, ignorance stemming from experiential impoverishment, or from misleading experiential associations
(imagine someone having had a bad experience with an earthly father),25
etc., concerning what God or God’s invitation is like. Such ignorance
should not be thought to be inexcusable on account of proper schooling
in the faith, say; it is not, or not primarily, an ignorance of catechesis or
a lack of other propositional sophistication. We know less about others’
23. Alison, On Being Liked, 143.
24. To be sure, there are opposing strains in the great theological traditions. I don’t
mean to present the uncontroversial here; I only hope to present a possible take-home
message, which I hope moves the reader. So I intend to present Aquinas under a favorable interpretation, as Aquinas himself presents his own forbears. I’ve filled in ellipses.
Certain strains in Aquinas suggest, by contrast to my interpretation here, “that God’s
goodness is different in kind from our own” (Harrison, “Animal Souls,” 533), so utterly
different that we lack even an experiential start in understanding or intuiting the spirit
behind divine law: in that case, we “should expect no more than oblivion, or considerably worse,” say, for a child who dies before baptism, even if that seems unjust to us. No
greater understanding of the circumstances, say, would in that case help us; only erasing
and replacing our values. Compare, by contrast, more recent Catholic tradition in the
works of John Paul II (winsomely introduced by Robert Barron, “Hell is Croweded”).
There is similar tension between some of Calvin’s proclamations and more moderating
strains found in the Calvinist tradition (Harrison, “Animal Souls,” and Kolokowski “Is
God Happy?” discuss parallels between Calvinism and Catholicism here).
25. See Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 216n. Related mishaps are many and
varied: another example would be to think propositionally that certain experientially
understood features of fun—like its risk, as in skiing—would have to attend fun. This
mistake might come from limits to our range of fun experiences. We might thereby conclude that heaven would be boring: for a quick, intuitive, sympathetic account of that way
of thinking about the afterlife, see Baggini’s, The Pig That Wants.
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experiential blindspots in moral and spiritual matters than we do about
their propositional deficiencies, which are easier to discern in discussion:
so we should take care not to assign personal blame lightly. Compare Jesus’s
warnings against judging others (Matt 7:1; Luke 6:37) and his statement of
forgiveness on the cross: “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they
do” (Luke 23:34; see also Acts 3:17).
There are many further applications of the experiential/propositional
distinction at hand, many of which have practical interest. Teaching and
preaching come especially to mind. The epistemological distinction at
hand suggests the urgency of making truths manifest by way of a battery of
conduits, in order to help the listener to unpack experientially the rich content of verbal articulation, the whole relevance of which can be otherwise
missed. Consider the importance of personal relationships in mentoring,
by which we may express our thought with gestures and nonverbal cues.
Consider the value of beauty in liturgy or art to convey sublimity. These
are nonverbal conduits. Verbal communication, too, can be more or less
experiential: the personal touch in story-telling and concrete narrative can
effectively illustrate philosophical and theological truths (here see Stump’s
arguments concerning the problem of evil).26 A proper understanding of
the experiential/propositional distinction upgrades these distinct avenues
of communication as concomitants to the teaching of doctrine, which is of
course propositionally conveyed as well.
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